GRANT’S CRUEL SUMMER

A. Wilson Greene’s article in the Spring 2018 issue on Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s early actions at Petersburg [“Grant’s Cruel Summer,” Vol. 8, No. 1] is intriguing, but ultimately disappointing because it does not interact with Grant’s personality and history. Greene’s Grant lives in a vacuum, cloistered not only from his own history and character, but from contemporary events unfolding elsewhere. We would scarcely explore General Robert E. Lee’s Gettysburg failure without contextualizing and offsetting it with his brilliant audacity at Chancellorsville weeks before. This article, denying Grant a similar context, leaves readers to wonder why he is counted as the Union’s foremost soldier. We see a strategic vacillator issuing confusing orders, dissembling with his generals, and evincing little interest in crucial operations—one who, instead, dallies in inane personal correspondence and feckless carousing. By 1864, however, Grant had largely demonstrated himself as one unwavering in strategic vision and focus, unflappable in danger, unambiguous in his commands, and uncomplicated in his honesty.

It would have been intriguing, therefore, had Greene endeavored to reconcile the early failings at Petersburg with Grant’s established generalship. What led to these deviations? What differed—either in Grant, the architect and victor of the other grand siege of the war at Vicksburg, or else in the present crucible in Virginia—to precipitate these events? Historians have suggested that Grant worked to threaten Lee such that he could not dispatch his forces to help foil other Union initiatives. Others see the looming national election as a key component of Grant’s urgency. And certainly we might consider how the mantle of national command compelled Grant to adjust the day-to-day focus of his generalship.

Without exploring such motivations and circumstances, I’m afraid this piece will do more to affirm the well-worn convictions of Lost Cause apologists than to further dialogue about the compelling and imperfect and enigmatic figure of Ulysses S. Grant.

Josh Linn
Carson City, Nevada

AMERICAN ILIAD

I’m sure that I stand with many readers of The Civil War Monitor when I say that Mark Grimsley’s column in the Spring 2018 issue [“American Iliad: Beyond the White Man’s Iliad,” Vol. 8, No. 1] touched raw nerves. Professor Grimsley obviously has thought long and deeply about this subject, and I respect his viewpoint. Nevertheless, I am compelled to strongly disagree with his conclusions.

First, I believe that his rationale for arguing for the removal of almost all statues of Robert E. Lee from public spaces is flawed. Grimsley states that removing statues does not represent the erasure of history, because it does not extend to book burning or Orwellian rewriting of history. However, far too few people read scholarly biographies and histories of the Civil War era. I would bet that, for many people, statues constitute their primary knowledge of the Civil War. On the other hand, how many people are inspired to begin reading about the conflict by viewing statues of Civil War figures? In the 20th and (so far) 21st centuries, we have seen many statues pulled down with the intent of erasing inconvenient history. Let’s not be quick to add to the total.

Second, I strongly object to Grimsley’s characterization of the American Iliad, “in its present form,” as “the White Man’s Iliad.” The Civil War certainly is the quintessential American Iliad, but to characterize it in white-only terms is just wrong. I certainly can understand that it may be perceived that way, as a result of, inter alia, the need for North-South reconciliation and the “Lost Cause” movement, but this approach ignores the role of the nearly 200,000 former slaves and free blacks who fought, bled, and died for their freedom, as well as the many who fled slavery, both before and during the war. If this story is not well known, if indeed the contributions of black troops have been “made invisible,” perhaps those who teach history should look themselves in the mirror.

Yes, Lee fought, and fought well, to preserve the Confederacy. Yes, he abrogated his oath to protect and defend the Constitution. But let’s not think we can solve our social problems by removing his statues from public view. That dog won’t hunt.

Richard Griffin
Via email

THE BEST CIVIL WAR BOOKS

As someone who enjoys Civil War novels, I concur with James Marten’s selections of The Killer Angels, Cold Mountain, and Widow of the South as among the best Civil War books ever published [“The Best Civil War Books of All Time,” Vol. 8, No. 1]. Two others I would include in this category are E.L. Doctorow’s The March, which describes William T. Sherman’s March to the Sea in beautiful prose, and The Judas Field by Howard Bahr, who takes us on a journey with survivors of the Battle of Franklin who are suffering from PTSD.

Given my particular interest in intelligence-related books, I noted none in this category were chosen by any of the three historians who provided their top picks. For the record, I nominate Edwin C. Fishel’s The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War as the all-time best in the intelligence category, with Grant’s Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox by William B. Feis not far behind. Also, as runner-up to these two, I include Come Retribution: The Confederate Secret Service and the Assassination of Lincoln by William A. Tidwell with James O. Hall and David Winfred Gaddy.

Tom Ryan
Bethany Beach, Delaware

WRONG ON PICKETT’S CHARGE?

I enjoyed the statistical data on Pickett’s Charge [“Figures: Pickett’s Charge,” Vol. 8, No. 1] in the Spring 2018 issue. However, there is no way Union forces suffered 2,300 casualties repelling the charge, which would amount to over one third of the estimated number of men listed as awaiting the assault. This would be true even if the losses from the Confederate artillery bombardment are included, as the guns mostly overshot the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. It is commonly agreed that total Union losses on July 3 came to about 3,000, and most of these were incurred in the heavy fighting on the Union right around Culp’s Hill in the morning. The Union losses during Pickett’s Charge probably were in the hundreds, not the thousands. Indeed, as per the provided data, only 2,000–3,000 Confederates managed to reach the Union lines, and I doubt that in the short time they were there they were able to kill or wound over 2,000 Union soldiers.

Dennis Middlebrooks
Brooklyn, New York

Ed. Thanks for your letter, Dennis. We reached out to Gettysburg licensed battlefield guide Larry Korczyk, who helped us compile the Pickett’s Charge statistics we published in the spring issue, for clarification. He writes: “I’ve checked my notes and references, particularly Jim Hessler and Wayne Motts’ outstanding book Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg: A Guide to the Most Famous Attack in American History (2015), in which they place the casualty figure between Union generals John Gibbon’s and Alexander Hays’ divisions at 1,930 men. By then adding in casualties among Union soldiers of other corps who supported these men, including rear echelon soldiers subjected to the Confederate artillery barrage, I view the 2,300 casualty figure as not unreasonable. Of course, we will never know the precise figure, but it’s certainly not in the mere hundreds. The discussion will surely continue!”

THE CIVIL WAR ALMANAC

Recently my wife surprised me with a copy of your publication The Civil War Almanac. Kind of funny since she didn’t know I subscribed to your fine magazine, just that I subscribe to several Civil War magazines. Well, I let her know about the Monitor.

Ken Lyle
Via email

Ed. We hope you enjoyed The Civil War Almanac, Ken. If so, you might also pick up a copy of our latest newsstand-only special, Gettysburg, which is on sale now. You can purchase a copy at most major booksellers or directly from us at civilwarmonitor.com/gettysburg.