Episode 2: Turning Points

Transcript

Terry Johnston: Jen, thanks very much for joining me. Our question for you today is from James in Maine. He asks, “I have always thought that the Battle of Antietam, not Gettysburg, was more the true turning point of the Civil War. What’s your thought on the matter?” That’s a big question. On one level both battles, Antietam and Gettysburg, are ones in which Union forces repulsed a Confederate invasion of the North. Was one more significant in this regard than the other?

Jennifer Murray: Yeah. Well, thank you for having me on to talk about this topic, Terry, and thanks to your reader for submitting this question. It’s certainly an intellectually fascinating question about turning points and specifically the regard to Antietam and Gettysburg. But I thought maybe as we start diving into the details of these two battles, I’d start with a comment about turning points and maybe a way to frame our thinking on this matter.

Terry Johnston: Sure.

Jennifer Murray: So, maybe we’ll ask ourselves what a turning point conveys. Like when we’re asking this question, what do we mean by it? And when I think of “turning point,” I think of history or an event like the Civil War is on a particular track, a particular course, until this one moment in time, this singular event like Gettysburg or Antietam occurs, and then this event, like the Civil War, takes another direction that leads to a different outcome. So, when I think about turning points, I think we assume there are immediate and long-term impacts, and that a battle like Gettysburg or Antietam indisputably alter the course of the war. And as we talk about this in 2025, we have the benefit of 160 some years of hindsight. We sort of read history backwards rather than how Civil War soldiers or Civil War Americans experienced it, which of course is reading it forward.

One thing I hope we get to chat about today is whether or not people in 1862 or 1863 looked at these events themselves as turning points. If they would consider Gettysburg or Antietam as a turning point. But to be sure, and the question reflects some of the scholarship, people like James McPherson, for instance, look at Gettysburg as a common interpreted turning point in the American Civil War. So, I think we’ll have a fun discussion with this topic here this afternoon.

Terry Johnston: Well, then, let’s dive back in. What is the case to be made then for Antietam and then Gettysburg? And as I alluded to earlier, there seems to be a common denominator in the fact that both could be construed as Union victories that repulsed a Confederate invasion of the North. That’s got to be a factor when weighing both as potential “turning points.”

Jennifer Murray: Yeah, and to be sure for Antietam—we’ll start there since chronologically it comes first in the war—if you think about Robert E. Lee’s objectives for the Maryland Campaign, and to your point about turning back the Confederate tide, there’s a lot riding on Lee’s invasion of Maryland. This is fresh off of the success at Second Manassas. He feels he has momentum on his side. An opportunity to invade Maryland, maybe get some Maryland men to join the Army of Northern Virginia. Perhaps a victory on foreign soil will gain Confederate recognition by Europe, specifically France and Great Britain. He can feed his army. This is the harvest season, of course. And perhaps most importantly is Lee’s thinking in the fall of 1862 that he might be able to influence the midterm elections. And that’s huge. What happens on a battlefield certainly influences politics and vice versa. These are not separate siloed spheres.

And of those goals, what does he accomplish? Relatively little of his aspirations come to fruition. He does take the war out of Virginia for a period of time, but the bigger objectives on the table, like foreign recognition and influencing midterm elections in any meaningful way, are not brought to fruition.

Terry Johnston: So, Lee doesn’t meet his goals for the Maryland Campaign. And that affects—negatively, I’m sure—Confederate morale. But on the flip side, how big a boost was Antietam to Union morale, both soldier and civilian?

Jennifer Murray: This is a good opportunity to look at how a campaign or a battle was viewed at that time. Union soldiers’ reputations are either created or solidified during the Maryland Campaign and at the Battle of Antietam. And if you think about this from a soldier’s perspective in the Army of the Potomac whom just experienced the Peninsula Campaign and the setbacks there in the summer of 1862, and now you get an opportunity to meet the Confederate army in Maryland.

And while it’s certainly a strategic victory for the Union forces, if it’s not a tactical draw, it does influence or bolster the morale of soldiers in the Union army. Now maybe I say that as a little bit of a generalization because there will be some frustrations in not following up. Lincoln of course comes and relieves McClellan of command, which is going to be another issue that creates some consternation, particularly among the officer corps in the Army of the Potomac. But in terms of morale boost, I think that would be a fair way to look at it. For the Union soldiers, the average rank and file.

Terry Johnston: It is interesting and important to note that, yes, this is a Union victory of some kind. But you’re right that in the aftermath, regardless of whatever boost there might have been to morale, there was also almost instantly real upheaval in the command structure of the Army of the Potomac. McClellan gets the boot, his replacement isn’t very long in the position, for reasons we don’t even have to get into. So, yeah, if you’re looking at the pluses and minuses of Antietam as a significant Union boost, you have to factor in the removal of McClellan.

Jennifer Murray: Yeah, and I think our tendency, and historians are guilty of this too, is maybe to look at things in like a narrow timeframe. We look at Antietam as just one specific day. But if you expand the aperture and you look at the Maryland Campaign, and really the story through October and November of 1862, perhaps it leads to some different thinking on it.

I mean, Lincoln is certainly frustrated with George McClellan for not pursuing. He sits mostly idle on the north side of the Potomac River for about six weeks to reorganize and resupply. And then, very famously as you mentioned, Lincoln is going to fire McClellan on November 5. And the timing of that is important because it’s one day after the midterm election. Lincoln certainly understands that—that what happens on a battlefield influences how people vote at the polls. Intrinsically linked politics and military affairs.

Terry Johnston: Well, I think one more thing about Antietam’s significance—before we move on to Gettysburg—is that Lincoln basically used the battle as political cover to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

Jennifer Murray: Absolutely. I think when we look at Antietam, and for the folks who really subscribe to Antietam as a turning point, that’s your ammunition—to talk about the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln considers this enough of a victory that he issues the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation just five days later. He convenes a special meeting of his cabinet. He very famously says, “I think the time has come now.” And then the Emancipation Proclamation takes effect on January 1, 1863. It indisputably redefines the purpose of the American Civil War. So now, not just a war for Union, as it was at the outset, but a war to preserve the Union and to emancipate 4 million enslaved people.

And I just don’t think there’s any bigger significance of the Battle of Antietam than that. And that doesn’t say that every Union soldier, of course, embraces emancipation. And we know that emancipation unfolds over a long period of time. But it absolutely redefines the nature of the war, and it pretty much guarantees that Europe, specifically France and Great Britain, will not formally recognize the Confederacy.

Terry Johnston: And it also opens up the door officially to black military enlistment.

Jennifer Murray: Absolutely.

Terry Johnston: So that’s a good case for Antietam, but let’s go back to Gettysburg. What’s the case for Gettysburg as the war’s more significant turning point as compared to Antietam?

Jennifer Murray: I think the case for Gettysburg is that Lee’s army is so badly damaged that, after Antietam, he doesn’t have the opportunity to launch another invasion of the North for eight more months. And that’s the Gettysburg Campaign, right off the heels of victory at Chancellorsville. Lee brings over 70,000 men into Pennsylvania and 28,000 of those soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia are casualties—killed, wounded, or captured. Lee will lose about 33 percent of his general officers. You know, if you take Pickett’s division—Pickett’s Charge, the iconic frontal assault on July 3—all three of the brigade commanders are killed or wounded: Kemper, Garnet, and Armstead.

So, if we think about turning points in numbers or statistics, those losses that Lee suffers in the summer of 1863 simply cannot be replaced. And even men—officers—who are wounded, like John Bell Hood, for instance, you have a finite amount of white men that can serve in these capacities and you’ve lost 28,000 of them in the Gettysburg Campaign.

Artist Thure de Thulstrup's painting of the Battle of Gettysburg

Terry Johnston: That seems to me to be the more effective argument for Gettysburg as a turning point than even the Confederate loss of morale as a result of it. Gettysburg’s known as the “high water mark” of the Confederacy, but, Confederate morale—and this is something Bill Marvel recently made the case for in our Winter 2024 issue—rebounds in late 1863 and early 1864. So Gettysburg’s a big hit to morale, yes, at least in the short term. But it seems to me that the actual losses, the physical losses, that’s something the Confederacy doesn’t have the ability to replace.

Jennifer Murray: Yeah. And I’m glad you mentioned that. When I was refreshing my mind on some things in anticipation of our conversation today, I went back to Gary Gallagher, who has an essay in his Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond book. And he builds on this in other places, but Gallagher tackles that question exactly: That soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia and civilians on the Confederate home front in no way in the summer of 1863 believed that Gettysburg was the death knell to their cause. While some of them view it certainly as a setback, they would not have defined the Battle of Gettysburg as the beginning of the end.

They didn’t see it as a catastrophic defeat, not like they would see Vicksburg. They still had considerable faith in Lee, certainly, and in themselves and in their army. So, when we think about turning points, really looking through the archival resources and the primary sources, what were people saying in 1863? How did they view it as a turning point? And this might take us to another point if you wanted to go there: For Gettysburg, the Union army and Union soldiers and veterans really craft this battle as the turning point in the days and weeks and months and years after July of 1863. That’s the origins of the turning point of Gettysburg story.

Terry Johnston: And that’s something that Antietam doesn’t have, does it? You don’t have veterans holding up that battle—I don’t think, at least, and correct me if I’m wrong, please—as they do Gettysburg, as you say.

Battle of Gettysburg historian John Bachelder

Jennifer Murray: Exactly. And you know, I’ve spent a fair amount of time on Gettysburg researching the memory of Gettysburg. I’ve written on that, looking at it in my Meade book now. To be sure, when the Army of the Potomac considers Gettysburg a victory, rightfully so, they immediately begin writing about Gettysburg. Like Elisha Hunt Rhodes says “the great battle of the war” has been fought. He says that right on the heels of the Battle of Gettysburg. And then you have the Philadelphia Inquirer, on July 6, the headline reads, “Waterloo Eclipsed.” And that’s so powerful. And we might gloss over that today, “Waterloo Eclipsed,” okay. But in 1863, Waterloo is not that far in the past. It’s 1815. The defining moment of the Napoleonic Wars where British and Prussian soldiers will finally defeat Napoleon’s forces irrevocably changes the geopolitical landscape in Europe in 1815. And now you have the Philadelphia Inquirer making a comparison of Waterloo to Gettysburg.

And that kind of rhetoric continues in the postwar years and when Union veterans would come to Gettysburg, say in the 1880s, right around the 25th anniversary, and they’re dedicating the monuments there, you can read their dedication speeches and very commonly they will invoke that same rhetoric, that Gettysburg is to Waterloo or Waterloo is to Gettysburg the one singular battle that turned the tide of the war. And I’d be remiss not to mention John Bachelder. He’s the first historian of Gettysburg and really one man’s influence is unparalleled in this way because he basically creates the “high water mark” narrative where he’s out and he singularly decides to save this copse of trees at the Angle where the Confederate assault focused on July the 3 from being hacked down or chopped away into bits and shards.

And he says, that’s where, not only the Battle of Gettysburg, but the entire Civil War, hinged. And the word copse of trees? What a silly word. Where do you ever call something a copse of trees for crying out loud? You know? It’s just the reverence for that specific piece of ground in our collective consciousness really underscores that Gettysburg is the turning point. And what’s the William Faulkner quote? July 3, every southern boy…

Terry Johnston: Right. If it could be done over again, or they put themselves there in their minds and it hasn’t happened yet.

Jennifer Murray: Yeah.

Terry Johnston: We just butchered that. We’re sorry to Faulkner. But that’s a really interesting point you’re making and maybe there’s an obvious answer, but it does make me think. So almost immediately, as you’re saying, after Gettysburg, there seems to be a consensus among the soldiers who fought there and the journalists who are covering it that this has eclipsed Waterloo. So, what did Gettysburg have, do you think, in their minds that Antietam didn’t? Was it that Gettysburg was a more decisive victory? Was that really all it took? Or was there more going on there?

Jennifer Murray: I studied the Army the Potomac, so I’m going to answer that question through the eyes of the soldiers in the Army of the Potomac. I think at this point in the war, in the summer of 1863, finally for those soldiers to go toe-to-toe with Robert E. Lee’s army and defeat him, it resonates in such a way that it bolsters their morale, their confidence in themselves. And if you think of the Army of the Potomac at the outset of this campaign, George Meade, who takes command of that army on June 28, is the third commander of that army just that calendar year. They have cycled through Burnside, Hooker, and now you have another commander? It’s a revolving door at that top echelon. So, finally, to gain indisputable victory against Robert E. Lee, it’s the most significant campaign victory that they’ve achieved. Elevates their morale in a way like Antietam didn’t. And even though once they pursue the Confederates from Gettysburg—and you get through the next two weeks and you get down on the Potomac River and you’re ready for that final death blow to the Confederates—even though that does not come, and Lincoln is furious with Meade, the Union soldiers still believe that they won a considerable victory at Gettysburg. Even if they didn’t destroy or annihilate the Confederate army, they know that they won an important victory.

Terry Johnston: Well, that’s another good point. With the emergence of Meade as the capable commander, finally, of the Army the Potomac, that’s got to go in Gettysburg’s favor as the bigger turning point, especially when you contrast that with what we were discussing about Antietam, where you had the turmoil in army command shortly after that battle with McClellan’s removal. So, the Army of Potomac seems to have been going in different directions in terms of stability after Antietam and Gettysburg, right?

Jennifer Murray: Yeah. And it’s interesting because Meade will grumble about McClellan not pursuing in his private correspondence after Antietam. He is very frustrated that the army’s sitting idle there and he thinks that McClellan should be a little bit more aggressive and it rings so eerily true to the same kind of criticisms that are going to be laid at Meade’s feed in the summer of 1863. But I will say, Meade’s star shines at its highest point on July 1, 2, and 3 of 1863. It shines at its brightest.

And then simultaneously it brings Meade his most frustrating period because of what happens as the army pursues to the Potomac River and Lee “escapes” on July the 14. And—we’re thinking of turning points here in this conversation—in terms of Lincoln’s views, Abraham Lincoln absolutely thinks that Meade should have done more during the Gettysburg Campaign. And if you flip through the Official Records and you look at some of the messages and the dispatches that’s coming into army headquarters, Meade is being hounded to do more. Lincoln will write on July 7 that if Meade can continue his work by “the literal or substantial destruction of Lee’s army”—these are Lincoln’s words—”the rebellion will be over.” At the same time, he’s learning about what happens at Vicksburg. So, you can see a little bit about why on July 14 when Lincoln hears that Lee’s army has “escaped” across the Potomac River, he writes that very emotional letter—he doesn’t send it—to Meade saying that, your golden opportunity is gone. Lee was within your grasp, and if you could have just closed upon him, it would’ve ended the war. So for Lincoln in the summer of 1863, we could argue whether or not that’s a just assessment. Lincoln certainly believed that Gettysburg could have ended the war. It would’ve been more than a turning point, right? It would’ve been the endpoint.

Terry Johnston: Yeah. Well, let’s circle back then to James’ original question. What’s your verdict? If we’re looking at Antietam and Gettysburg specifically, is there one over the other that you would consider to be more of a turning point in the war?

Jennifer Murray: And I have to pick between those two.

Terry Johnston: Well, that’s what James wants you to do.

Jennifer Murray: So I’ll pick between those two and then I’ll tell you like option three.

Terry Johnston: Sure.

Jennifer Murray: So between those two, I would say in terms of strategic, political, global consequences Antietam is a bigger turning point than Gettysburg for the Emancipation Proclamation, like we talked about, the chances of foreign recognition are not realistic after that is issued. How it influences the midterm elections, the Republicans fair pretty well in the midterm elections. You can imagine the opposite scenario had the Confederates done better at Antietam or perhaps just lingered around in Maryland a little bit more. Maybe the Democrats would’ve picked up more seats than they did, or maybe some of the governor positions would’ve swung the other way.

For those reasons, I would say Antietam. In memory, of course, it’s Gettysburg. But at that time, and you’re forcing me to pick, I’d say Antietam.

Terry Johnston: Well, this may or may not make you feel any better, but I’d agree with you. I do think the inclusion of the Emancipation Proclamation with Antietam, it ushered in, as you said earlier, a big shift in both the purpose of the war—opening the door to African-American enlistment—and in keeping England and France out. I don’t know if anything associated with Gettysburg can match the impact that the Emancipation Proclamation had.

So, you alluded earlier to wanting to nominate another event that might be considered a bigger turning point than either Antietam or Gettysburg. So, what do you have for us?

Jennifer Murray: Well, I’m an eastern theater person myself, so I focus most of my reading and attention there, as many of us do. But, of course, you have to throw Vicksburg into the equation, with Grant’s bagging, what, 29,000 Confederate soldiers who will not fight again. Follow that up with the collapse of Port Hudson on July 9. The Federals have the Mississippi River under control now, and all that territory to the west is cut off from the Confederacy.

And I will say, in terms of looking at what people at that time said about these battles, it’s pretty clear that many Confederate soldiers and politicians and civilians recognized Vicksburg as a cataclysmic disaster. Not like Gettysburg. They didn’t recognize Gettysburg as a cataclysmic, irrevocable disaster, as we mentioned, but they surely do about Vicksburg. The governor of Georgia, for instance, Joseph Brown, says it’s a serious disaster. I think that one needs to go on the table.

And then I would submit also part of the Overland Campaign, specifically after the Battle of the Wilderness, when Meade and Grant and their respective staffs decide to turn south, that iconic moment when they reach the intersection of the Orange Plank Road and the Brock Road. This is the night of May 7. And they head south, they press towards Richmond. And it’s a clear signal of Grant’s intent to press towards the Confederate capital. Whereas in the past, these battles occur and then the armies break contact as traditionally done. When they move south down the road—a literal turning point—it’s clear that Grant is going to continue to press the enemy and press towards Richmond.

And Grant writes about that moment in his memoir. It’s depicted in several sketches at the time. The soldiers of the Army of Potomac write about it. A lot of II Corps soldiers write about it. Meade writes about it. All the cheering and the enthusiasm indicating, as Grant says, that soldiers have passed through the beginning of the end in the battle that they just fought.

Terry Johnston: And the soldiers do literally cheer. It’s a remarkable thing, right? If you could put yourself back in that time and witness that, it must have been a really powerful scene.

Jennifer Murray: Yeah. And this is right on the heels of the Wilderness. Of course, they don’t know what’s to come. And, obviously, the Overland Campaign will surpass so much of the carnage and the horrors that they have already experienced in 1864. But yeah, they are literally cheering and thinking, what makes these sacrifices worthwhile at this point? Why am I continuing to serve in the ranks? To make the sacrifices of those fallen soldiers mean something, to continue to fight on. Which is what Lincoln says in the Gettysburg Address, that those men shall not have died in vain.

Terry Johnston: I’m thinking too if we’re nominating other events that may potentially be considered, what about the fall of Atlanta, which is something that happens in the runup to the 1864 presidential election. Up until the fall of Atlanta, Lincoln is convinced that he’s going to lose. Sherman takes Atlanta and it seems to really give Lincoln a shot in the arm. Where would that rank?

Jennifer Murray: Yeah, I would certainly put that on the table too, but also the election of 1864. And I like the point that you just said too about, we look at Lincoln today in this particular place in our collective thinking because of the assassination. But in the war, Lincoln’s reelection in 1864 is not certain. And we tend to look at the North as being kind of monolithic. They’re just fighting the Confederates, this external enemy. But there’s a tremendous amount of political volatility in the North from the Democrats, obviously—our friend George McClellan runs against Lincoln in 1864—and then also from within for Lincoln with the Republican Party, the factions within his own party.

So, in no way is he certain that he’s going to be reelected. The fall of Atlanta, the success of Sherman in the western theater, very much give him the shot in the arm. And the soldiers in the Army of the Potomac cast their votes overwhelmingly for Abraham Lincoln, not the beloved George McClellan.

Terry Johnston: Well, there you have it. Before we wrap this up, any final words on turning points in general? Have you reconsidered your picks already?

Jennifer Murray: Well, I thought this was a fun exercise. These are fun conversations to have, but I would just encourage people to think about the war holistically and look at maybe multiple moments. And think about a series of events that may be combined collectively to bring about Union victory or collapse of the Confederacy, sometimes on the battlefield, but sometimes at the election polls also. And always, always go back to the primary sources. I think that’s the best evidence to how people at the time viewed any of these fights and engagements. Read the words of the civilians or the soldiers or the politicians at that time, and I think you get a pretty good sense of how they looked at any of these events.

About the Guest

Jennifer M. Murray

Jennifer M. Murray is assistant professor of history at Shepherd University, where she oversees the George Tyler Moore Center for the Study of the Civil War. She is working on a biography of Union general George G. Meade.

Additional Resources

William Marvel, “Rebel Revival,” The Civil War Monitor (Winter 2024)
Gary W. Gallagher, ed., The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond (1994)
All for the Union: The Civil War Letters and Diary of Elisha Hunt Rhodes (1991)
High Water Mark Monument and Copse of Trees
William Faulkner’s Pickett’s Charge quote
The Gettysburg Address

Transcript

About the Guest

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